Fourth Amendment Protections for the Juvenile Probationer After In Re Tyrell J. by Joyce, Kristin Anne
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 36 | Number 3 Article 6
1-1-1996
Fourth Amendment Protections for the Juvenile
Probationer After In Re Tyrell J.
Kristin Anne Joyce
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Kristin Anne Joyce, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protections for the Juvenile Probationer After In Re Tyrell J., 36 Santa Clara L. Rev.
865 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss3/6
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
THE JUVENILE PROBATIONER
AFTER IN RE TYRELL J.
Justice should not be compromised by well-intentioned
aims to correct transgressing youths, and the rehabilita-
tive value of treating juveniles with fairness must not be
underrated.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Three gang members approached a uniformed police of-
ficer and a police detective, who were on patrol at a high
school football game.2 The officers noticed that, although it
was a very warm night, one of the teenagers wore a heavy,
quilted coat.3 The officers also knew that the boys' gang had
been involved in a shooting incident the week before at an-
other football game.4 They suspected that the boy in the
heavy coat might be carrying a weapon. 5 A subsequent
search of the boy revealed a large hunting knife.6 The officers
asked all three boys to walk to a nearby fence.7
As one of the boys, Tyrell J., approached the fence, he
adjusted his pants three times." Tyrell J. was a juvenile pro-
bationer.9 One of the conditions of his probation was that he
"[s]ubmit to a search of [his] person and property, with or
without a warrant, by any law enforcement officer, probation
officer or school official."' °
1. In re Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 109 (Cal.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
2. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1701 (1995).
3. Id. at 522.
4. Id. at 521-22.
5. Id. at 522.
6. Id.
7. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 522.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 521. Tyrell J. was declared a ward of the court on May 21, 1991,
after he committed a battery on school grounds. Id.
10. Id. (alterations in original). This particular condition of probation will
be referred to throughout the comment as "probationary search condition" or
"search condition."
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The uniformed police officer lacked probable cause to
search Tyrell J.," and he was also unaware of Tyrell J.'s pro-
bationary search condition.' 2 Nonetheless, he conducted a
pat search of Tyrell J. and discovered that he was hiding a
bag of marijuana in his pants. 13
A petition was filed alleging that Tyrell J. came within
the provisions of California Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602,14 in that he possessed marijuana for the purpose
of selling it.15 Tyrell J. denied the allegation and moved to
suppress the evidence of the marijuana. 16 At the hearing on
the motion to suppress, Tyrell J. testified that his belt and his
pants become undone, and that when he was walking toward
the fence, he was simply trying to refasten his pants."' He
claimed that the marijuana was obtained as the result of an
unlawful search.' 8
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress, but the
court of appeal reversed. 19 It reasoned that "the fortuity of
[Tyrell J.'s] search condition did not validate the otherwise
improper search."20 However, the California Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeal decision, holding that the search
was constitutional despite the officer's ignorance of Tyrell J.'s
search condition.2 ' Significantly, on April 17, 1995, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 22 Thus, war-
rantless searches of juvenile probationers who have proba-
tion conditions are constitutional in California, even where
11. Id. at 522 n.1. The officer's lack of probable cause was not disputed by
either party in the court below. Id. Therefore, the California Supreme Court
did not reach the argument, raised by amicus curiae, that the officer actually
did have probable cause to detain and search Tyrell J. Id.
12. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 522.
13. Id.
14. Id. The code provides that
[ainy person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law
of this state... defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a
curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984).





20. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 522
21. Id. at 521.
22. Tyrell J. v. California, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
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the searching officer has no knowledge of the juvenile's proba-
tionary condition.
This comment examines the purposes behind the Fourth
Amendment and the accompanying exclusionary rule to de-
termine whether the bag of marijuana should have been ad-
missible evidence against a juvenile probationer. 23 The com-
ment then discusses other parole and probation cases that
the California Supreme Court relied upon in reaching its de-
cision to admit the marijuana as evidence. 24 Finally, it exam-
ines whether the goals of the Fourth Amendment and the
"special needs" of the juvenile probation system can be har-
monized so as to rehabilitate juvenile probationers and deter
future misconduct, while respecting the juvenile's basic con-
stitutional rights.2 5
This comment proposes that a juvenile probationer's
search condition must be known to the police officer before he
or she conducts a valid warrantless search.26 Furthermore,
sufficient proof of that knowledge must be made before any-
thing discovered during the search can be admitted into evi-
dence at trial.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and
Exceptions
1. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment states that the "right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation .... "28 The Fourth Amendment thus
proscribes governmental intrusions into peoples' lives unless
a judicial process has been followed and a warrant has been
obtained. 29 This constitutional right is enforced by an exclu-
23. See discussion infra part II.A.
24. See discussion infra part II.B-D.
25. See discussion infra part II.E.
26. See discussion infra part V.
27. See discussion infra part V.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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sionary rule,3 ° which generally prohibits admission at trial of
evidence that is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.3 ' The exclusionary rule applies to adult proceedings as
well as to juvenile proceedings which are, as in Tyrell J., filed
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.32
2. Probation as an Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recog-
nized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment in "circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable."33 In such cir-
cumstances, courts balance governmental and privacy inter-
ests to evaluate the practicality of the Fourth Amendment
warrant and probable cause requirements.3 4
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,3 5 the Court asserted that a
state's "probation system . . . presents 'special needs' beyond
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."3 6 Specifi-
cally, the Griffin Court highlighted the supervision element
of probation, which exists to assure that conditions of proba-
tion are fulfilled. 7
The Court noted recent research which suggested that
more intensive supervision could reduce recidivism .3  Addi-
tionally, research indicated that the importance of supervi-
sion had grown as probation had become a more common sen-
30. "IT]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The main purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. Id. at 347. Additionally, it
assures "all potential victims of unlawful government conduct.., that the gov-
ernment [will] not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of
seriously undermining popular trust in government." Id. at 357.
31. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
32. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1298 n.17 (Cal. 1985).
33. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
34. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20
(1989).
35. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
36. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74.
37. Id. at 875.
38. Id. (citing Joan Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49 FED. PRO-
BATION 9 (June 1985)).
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tence for people convicted of serious crimes. 39 Thus, the
Court reasoned, "supervision . . . is a 'special need' of the
[s]tate permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that
would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large."40
The Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirement is the rule; dispensing with this rule is the ex-
ception.41 Probation falls under the category of exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment's requirements. 42 Its supervision el-
ement justifies flexibility in obtaining a warrant based on
probable cause, and it justifies impinging upon a person's pri-
vacy.43 In fact, the emphasis on supervision as a means of
reducing recidivism is so strong that courts have fashioned it
into one of the terms of probation: the search condition.44
B. The Constitutionality of Probation Search Conditions
1. Upholding a Warrantless Search Because of
Probation Condition
The existence of a probation search condition has been
used to justify a warrantless search of a probationer, and to
allow evidence found during the search to be used later at
trial.45 For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin,46 one condition
of the petitioner's probation was that any probation officer
could conduct a warrantless search of the probationer's home,
as long as the officer's supervisor approved and there were
reasonable grounds to believe that contraband was present.4 7
During the course of such a warrantless search, a gun was
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
42. See supra text accompanying note 36.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
44. See supra text accompanying note 10; see also infra parts II.B.1 and
II.E. In People v. Bravo, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that
"It]he purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search.., is to ascertain whether
[the defendant] is complying with the terms of probation; to determine not only
whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law." People v.
Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 342 (Cal. 1987) (quoting People v. Kern, 71 Cal. Rptr. 105,
107 (Ct. App. 1968)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988). Information obtained
during these searches would give a good measure of the effectiveness of the
supervision and the defendant's amenability to rehabilitation. Id.
45. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Griffin involved an adult
probationer, unlike Tyrell J., which involved a juvenile probationer. See id.
46. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
47. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871.
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found.48 The gun was later used as the basis for the peti-
tioner's conviction on a state weapons offense.49
In a close decision,5 ° the United States Supreme Court
held that the "search of Griffin's residence was 'reasonable'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was
conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing proba-
tioners."5 The Court reasoned that probationary "restric-
tions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a pe-
riod of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not
harmed by the probationer's being at large."52 Probationers,
therefore, have a diminished expectation of privacy because
of the terms of their probation.5"
Justice Blackmun dissented in Griffin, arguing that in
holding as it did, the Court was taking "another step that di-
minishes the protection given by the Fourth Amendment." 4
The dissent acknowledged the need for supervision of proba-
tioners to assure compliance with the terms of probation.5 5
However, that need did "not also justify an exception to the
warrant requirement, and [the dissent] would retain this
means of protecting a probationer's privacy."56 While the dis-
sent approved of a lower standard of review for issuing search
warrants for probationers with search conditions, 57 it stated
48. Id. at 870.
49. Id.
50. The decision was 5-4. Id. at 869.
51. Id. at 880.
52. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
53. Id. at 872. "[It is always true of probationers (as... [is] true of parol-
ees) that they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is enti-
tled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of spe-
cial [probation] restrictions."' Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972)).
54. Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Fourth Amend-
ment requires that probable cause exist before a warrant will be issued. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. See also supra text accompanying note 28. However, the
Griffin majority declined to adopt a "reasonable grounds" standard, as the lower
court had done. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872. A reasonable grounds standard of
review for obtaining a search warrant is a lower threshold than the probable
cause requirement. Id. The dissent noted that "extensive inquiry may be re-
quired to gather the information necessary to establish probable cause that a
violation has occurred, [but] a 'reasonable grounds' standard allows a probation
agent to avoid this delay and to intervene at an earlier stage of suspicion." Id.
at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that a reasonable
grounds standard was consistent with the amount of supervision necessary to
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that "a reduced need for review does not justify a complete
removal of the warrant requirement."5
8
Griffin upheld the constitutionality of search conditions
which permit warrantless searches of adult probationers.5 9
However, the Griffin majority expressly declined to address
whether any warrantless search was permissible if based on
reasonable grounds alone.6° Similarly, certain California
Supreme Court cases have held that even where search con-
ditions were in effect, the conditions alone did not justify the
warrantless search of probationers.61
2. Previous California Cases Have Held that Search
Conditions Do Not Justify a Warrantless
Search
a. People v. Gallegos
In People v. Gallegos,62 police officers conducted an ille-
gal search of the defendant's apartment.13 The search dis-
closed heroin and marijuana, as well as instruments used in
administering drugs.64 At the time, the adult defendant was
on parole for a narcotics violation.65 However, the record did
"not disclose and no claim [was] made that [the defendant]
protect the public and aid in the probationer's rehabilitation. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
58. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 886 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 880.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
62. 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
63. Gallegos, 397 P.2d. at 177. The police officer acted on a tip from an
informant, of unknown reliability, who had just been found in his car, uncon-
scious from a heroin overdose. Id. at 175. While still under the influence of
heroin, the informant told police that he had purchased the drug from the de-
fendant, whom the informant knew only by nickname. Id.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 175. Under the California Penal Code, "[pirisoners on parole
shall remain under the legal custody of the department and shall be subject at
any time to be taken back within the [enclosure] of the prison." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3056 (West 1982). Furthermore, People v. Denne held that a parolee's
place of residence could be searched by parole officers in the same manner as
the search of a prisoner's cell. People v. Denne, 297 P.2d 451, 457 (Cal. 1956).
Therefore, although Gallegos was an adult prisoner on parole, his "status" was
effectively the same as a juvenile probationer with a search condition. See infra
part IV.C; see also People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251 (Cal. 1986) (acknowledg-
ing that a search condition is imposed on an adult parolee, and that the adult
parolee does not voluntarily consent to this condition).
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was detained as a possible parole violator or that his prem-
ises were searched for that reason."6
The California Supreme Court held that where "the sta-
tus of the defendant as a parolee was not relied upon by the
arresting officer... [the fruits of an illegal search] could not
be utilized in justification of the arrest."6 7 Although Gallegos
did not question the constitutionality of a warrantless search
condition, it firmly stated that the fortuity of such a condi-
tion, and the fruits obtained during the search, could not be
introduced to justify an arrest.6
b. In re Martinez
Similarly, in In re Martinez,69 police officers conducted a
full search of the defendant's home without a search warrant,
and later introduced evidence obtained during that search at
trial.70 At the time of the search, the defendant, an adult,
was on parole, subject to a search condition.71 The California
Supreme Court held that the evidence seized need not be ex-
cluded from parole revocation proceedings because the
Fourth Amendment's accompanying exclusionary rule is in-
applicable to such proceedings.72 However, the court noted
that the investigation involved suspected criminal activity,
and not parole violations.73 Therefore, "the officers [could
not] undertake a search without probable cause and then
later seek to justify their actions by relying on the defend-
66. People v. Gallegos, 397 P.2d 174, 175 (Cal. 1964).
67. Id. at 176.
68. Id. at 176, 177.
69. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
70. In re Martinez, 463 P.2d at 736. The police discovered heroin during the
search, and the defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to state
prison for possession of heroin. Id. That conviction, in turn, led to a formal
revocation of the defendant's parole, in a hearing before the Adult Authority.
Id.
71. Id. at 738.
72. Id. at 740. The court considered the social consequences of imposing the
exclusionary rule upon the Adult Authority and concluded that "an agency
whose delicate duty is to decide when a convicted offender can be safely allowed
to return to and remain in society is in a different posture than the court which
decides his original guilt." Id. However, in declining to apply the exclusionary
rule to parole revocation proceedings, the court did "not, of course, intimate that
these exclusionary rules are not applicable to other administrative proceed-
ings." Id. at 741.
73. Id. at 738. The record from the lower court "made clear that the officers
were not aware of defendant's [parole] status, but were merely performing their
normal investigatory activities." Id. at 737 n.4.
[Vol. 36872
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ant's parole status, a status of which they were unaware at
the time of their search."
74
Although probationary search conditions themselves are
constitutional,75 the California Supreme Court acknowledged
in both Gallegos and Martinez that search conditions could
not be used as after-the-fact justification for police
misconduct.7 6
C. The Relevance of Consent
1. Consent as an Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Requirement
In addition to special circumstances beyond the normal
needs of law enforcement which may justify an exception to
the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,77 another
exception is consent.78 When an adult agrees to probation,
the adult loses some Fourth Amendment protections in ex-
change for limited freedom. 9
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of an
adult probationer consenting in advance to a warrantless
search in People v. Bravo.8 0 There, an anonymous caller in-
formed police that Bravo, an adult probationer, might be
dealing drugs.81 Although police surveillance of Bravo's
home revealed nothing suspicious, the police discovered that
Bravo was on probation and could be subjected to a warrant-
less search. 2 Thereafter, the police conducted a warrantless
search of Bravo's home, which led to the discovery and
74. Id. at 737.
75. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 62-74.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
78. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see also People v.
Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988). "A search
conducted pursuant to a valid consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment
unless the search exceeds the scope of the consent." Bravo, 738 P.2d at 338.
Where there is valid, voluntary consent, the only issue is the scope of the per-
son's consent. Id.
79. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 341.
80. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988).
81. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 337.
82. Id. The police officers confirmed this by obtaining a copy of Bravo's pro-
bation conditions. Id. The officers interpreted the search condition as an ap-
parent waiver of Bravo's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Bravo did not claim
that the waiver was not voluntary or that the search condition was unreasona-
ble. Id.
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seizure of cocaine, firearms, and cash. 8 This evidence was
used to convict Bravo of various criminal offenses.8 4
Bravo argued unsuccessfully that, notwithstanding his
probation search condition, a rule of reasonableness should
apply, permitting a warrantless search only if police had rea-
sonable cause to believe that Bravo was involved in criminal
activity.8 5 However, an adult probationer "consents to the
waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the
opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term."8 6 Thus,
the court held that "a search condition of probation that per-
mits a search without a warrant also permits a search with-
out 'reasonable cause,' as the former includes the latter. "87
The majority explained that the "purpose of an unex-
pected, unprovoked search of [a probationer] is to ascertain
whether he [or she] is complying with the terms of [his or her]
probation .... Therefore, conditioning "warrantless pro-
bation searches upon reasonable cause would make the pro-
bation order superfluous and vitiate its purpose."8 9
The court stated that waiving Fourth Amendment rights
as a condition of probation does not permit searches under-
taken for harassment, or searches for arbitrary or capricious
reasons. 90 Additionally, warrantless searches of probationers
should only be conducted for reasons related to the rehabilita-
tive and reformative goals of probation, or other legitimate
law enforcement purposes.9 1 Therefore, if there was an ad-
vance waiver of the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights,
police officers needed neither a search warrant nor probable
cause to search the probationer's home. 2
83. Id.
84. Id. Bravo was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine
for sale, and possession by a convicted felon of a concealable firearm. Id.
85. Id.
86. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 341.
87. Id. at 342-43. The court observed that "if a sentencing judge believes
that a 'reasonable cause' requirement is warranted in the particular case... he
has the discretion to place such language in the probation search condition. Ab-
sent such express language, however, a reasonable-cause requirement will not
be implied." Id. at 340 n.6.
88. Id. at 342 (quoting People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 632 (Cal. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972)).
89. Id. (quoting People v. Bravo, 211 Cal. Rptr. 439, 445 (Ct. App. 1985)
(Sonenshine, J, dissenting)).
90. Id.
91. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 342.
92. Id. at 342-43.
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2. A Juvenile Probationer Cannot Refuse Consent
Probation for an adult is "not a matter of right but rather
... an act of grace and clemency .... [I]ts purpose is reform
and rehabilitation . . . ."9 While an adult probationer can
choose to waive his or her Fourth Amendment rights in order
to avoid a state prison term, and thus consent in advance to
governmental intrusions, a juvenile probationer has no such
choice.94
A juvenile court has a variety of options once it deter-
mines that a minor is a ward of the court.9 5 Under the Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code, when a juvenile court
places a minor on probation, it "may impose and require any
and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting
and proper to the end that justice may be done and the refor-
mation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced."96 Further-
more, nothing in the California Welfare and Institutions
Code "shall be construed to limit the authority of [a juvenile]
court to... provide conditions of probation."97
The goals of both adult and juvenile probation are refor-
mation and rehabilitation of the offender. 98 In the juvenile
setting, however, probation is not "an act of leniency in lieu of
statutory punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order for
the [minor]."9 9 Probation conditions are deemed necessary
for the dual purposes of reformation and rehabilitation, and
the juvenile offender is given no choice to accept or reject
them.100 Such a choice would be "inconsistent with the juve-
nile court's determination of the best manner in which to fa-
cilitate rehabilitation of a minor."10 1
An adult probationer can choose to waive his or her
Fourth Amendment rights, and thereby consent in advance to
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990).
94. See In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 526 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1701 (1995).
95. Id.
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730(b) (West Supp. 1995).
97. Id. § 729.6(i).
98. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 526.
99. Id. (quoting In re Ronnie P., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 882 (Ct. App. 1992)).
100. Id. at 527. However, the court did note that a minor can object to par-
ticular conditions of probation as being "improper or unwarranted." Id. at 527
n.3.
101. Id. at 527.
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a warrantless search.102 Since a juvenile probationer is not
given a choice, a juvenile probationer cannot be said to truly
consent in advance to a warrantless search. 10 3
D. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
1. Constitutional Provisions
The California Constitution enumerates privacy as one of
a person's inalienable rights. 104 The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution implies a right of privacy, in
that it protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 10 5 It is a well-settled principle that "any warrant-
less search is unreasonable per se within the contemplation
of the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to
one of the few, narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitu-
tional requirement of a warrant."1 0 6 In considering the rea-
sonableness of a search, one must determine whether the per-
son being searched can be said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the first place.
10 7
In Katz v. United States,10 8 the United States Supreme
Court posited a two-part inquiry to determine whether a per-
son's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. 10 9 First,
a court asks whether the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search.110 Second, a court determines whether society is will-
ing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."'
102. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 337 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
904 (1988).
103. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 526.
104. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1. The California Constitution provides that all
"people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 28.
106. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 342. Consent is one such exception. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
109. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
111. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
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2. In re Marcellus L.
In In re Marcellus L.,112 a juvenile probationer was said
to have no reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no
standing to object to a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.1 13 There, although a police officer lacked articulable
facts to justify a search, he conducted a pat search of a teen-
ager. 4 The officer did not know that the boy was on proba-
tion which included a search condition." 5 Cocaine base was
found on the boy's person during the search, and that evi-
dence was later used against the boy in a juvenile court
proceeding.11
6
The California Court of Appeal held that the teenager
could not object to the search although the police officer was
unaware of the probation search condition." 7 It stated that
this holding was "consistent with and in furtherance of the
purposes of juvenile court law," and that suppressing the evi-
dence would not be in the teenager's best interests."l8
The Marcellus L. court explained that "[w]hat is critical
is that the juvenile probationer has been admitted to proba-
tion upon a legitimate search condition.., and has absolutely
no reasonable expectation to be free from the type of search
here conducted . . . -"19 Furthermore, the court refused to
extend the juvenile's expectation of privacy to searches con-
ducted by police officers who were ignorant of a juvenile's pro-
bationary status.
20
112. 279 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1991).
113. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
114. Id. at 902-03. Around noon on a school day, the police officer saw
Marcellus L. sitting in front of a "crack house." Id. at 902. The officer asked the
minor his name and decided to investigate why Marcellus L. was not at school.
Id. Marcellus L. did not do anything threatening, and the officer had no reason
to believe Marcellus L. was armed or dangerous; nonetheless, the officer de-
cided to conduct a pat search for "safety reasons." Id. at 902-03.
115. Id. at 903. The general search clause read as follows: "Submit person,
any vehicle under minor's control, [and] residence to search [and] seizure by a
peace officer at any time of the day or night with/without a warrant." Id. at 902
n. 1.
116. Id. at 903.
117. Id. at 908.
118. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
119. Id. at 907 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 908. The majority stated:
[Marcellus L.] was placed on probation subject to being searched by a
peace officer without a warrant; he was frisked by a peace officer with-
out a warrant; his condition was not that he was subject to search by a
peace officer who knew of the search condition; hence the peace officer's
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3. In re Binh L.
The California Court of Appeal also found that a juvenile
probationer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in In re
Binh L.121 There, as in Marcellus L., a police officer with
neither probable cause nor knowledge of the minor's preexist-
ing probation search condition, found incriminating evi-
dence1 2 2 during a search of the minor's person.1
23
The Binh L. court asked "whether the manner in which
the officer conducted himself was so gross as to invade any
residual expectation of privacy the minor might have had in
light of his [probation condition]." 24 The court then found
that the officer's ignorance of the search condition was irrele-
vant because the juvenile lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 125 Therefore, the juvenile's Fourth Amendment
rights had not been violated. 21
Thus juvenile probationers, like adult probationers, have
a diminished expectation of privacy.1 27 Adult probationers
consent to a diminished expectation of privacy by waiving
their Fourth Amendment rights.1 28 A juvenile probationer,
on the other hand, has a diminished expectation of privacy
because of the mere fact of being on probation and having an
imposed condition. 2s The policies behind imposing a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in the juvenile setting are dis-
cussed below.' 30
E. The Juvenile Probation Scheme
1. The Special Needs of Juvenile Probation
Under the California Welfare and Institutions Code, mi-
nors "under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a conse-
quence of delinquent conduct shall... receive care, treatment
lack of knowledge extended appellant's expectation of privacy not one
whit.
Id.
121. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992).
122. The incriminating evidence was a loaded pistol. In re Binh L., 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 680.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 684-85.
125. Id. at 684.
126. Id. at 685.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 86, 102.
129. See supra text accompanying note 119.
130. See infra part II.E.1.
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and guidance which is consistent with their best interest,
which holds them accountable for their behavior, and which
is appropriate for their circumstances."' 3 ' Importantly, juve-
nile courts and those charged with administering juvenile
court law must consider the safety and protection of the gen-
eral public.'1 2 In a sense, probation exists as a means of re-
taining public confidence in the juvenile justice system.'33
California's juvenile probation system is designed to re-
habilitate juvenile offenders and deter future misconduct. 134
It operates on the assumption that a minor is given special
protections, but at the same time, lacks certain privileges and
rights accorded adults. 135
The function of probation is subject to different interpre-
tations. 36 Juvenile probationers may consider it punish-
ment for their wrongdoing, or as a framework for accomplish-
ing a social rehabilitation. 37  Alternatively, it may be
interpreted as neither rehabilitation nor punishment, but
rather as a social plan which focuses on the welfare of the
juvenile probationer and the community.'13
2. The Special Role of the Probation Officer
Juvenile probation requires that the minor control his or
her behavior in certain ways' 39 and live within the law.140 It
is designed to help the juvenile make an adequate readjust-
ment to society with the help of a probation officer. 14
The probation officer is one "institution" charged with en-
forcing, interpreting, and administering juvenile court law,
including ensuring that the conditions of probation are ful-
filled.142 On the one hand, the probation officer serves as an
131. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (West Supp. 1995).
132. Id. § 202(b).
133. Charles H. Shireman, Perspectives on Juvenile Probation, in PURSUING
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 138, 141 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976).
134. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1995).
135. W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH
15 (1972).
136. EDWARD ELDEFONSO, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER




140. Id. at 247.
141. Id. at 242.
142. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(d) (West Supp. 1995).
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arm of the court; on the other, he or she is a correctional so-
cial worker. 143 The probation officer, in effect, represents the
law-abiding citizen. 144 He or she helps the juvenile "internal-
ize new value systems [and] achieve perceptions of nonviola-
tive [lifestyles] as being inherently more appealing and
satisfying. "145
The United States Supreme Court highlighted the spe-
cial role of the probation officer in Griffin v. Wisconsin.146
The majority opinion noted that a probation officer "is an em-
ployee of the [s]tate .. .who, while assuredly charged with
protecting the public interest, is also supposed to have in
mind the welfare of the probationer ... 14
In the probation context, there is an ongoing supervisory
relationship between the probationer and the probation of-
ficer, which allows for some flexibility with the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. 148 According to the Grif-
fin majority, the circumstances of probation require that in
some cases, including those involving drugs or weapons, a
probation officer "must be able to act based upon a lesser de-
gree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would other-
wise require in order to intervene before a probationer does
damage to himself or society."1 49 In deciding when effective
rehabilitation demands intervention by a probation officer,
the probation office "must be able to proceed on the basis of
its entire experience with the probationer, and to assess
probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, charac-
ter, and circumstances."15 °
However, the Griffin dissent failed to see how the proba-
tion officer's role in fostering the growth and development of
the probationer was enhanced "the slightest bit" by the abil-
ity to search a probationer without meeting the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and neutral magistrate require-
143. ELDEFONSO, supra note 136, at 242.
144. Id. at 247.
145. Shireman, supra note 133, at 143.
146. 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). Although Griffin involved probation in the
adult context, its comments on the role of a probation officer are equally appli-
cable to the discussion at hand.
147. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
148. See id. at 879; see also People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988).
149. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879.
150. Id.
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ment.151 Furthermore, the dissent argued that, if anything,
giving the probation officer the power to decide to search
would be a barrier to establishing any amount of trust be-
tween the probation officer and the probationer. 152
3. The Role of the Police Officer
A police officer, unlike a probation officer, has no ongoing
supervisory relationship with a juvenile probationer. 153 Yet,
a police officer is one of the law enforcement officials who may
search a juvenile probationer without a warrant.154 Even if it
is a police officer who searches the juvenile probationer, the
purposes of the search are still rehabilitation and
deterrence. 155
Since warrantless searches may be conducted by police
officers as well as by probation officers, a juvenile probationer
must assume that every law enforcement officer could stop
and search him or her at any time. 156 It is precisely this fear
that is supposed to provide a deterrent effect upon the juve-
nile who may be tempted to return to a life of delinquency. 157
Both police and probation officers serve important roles
in rehabilitating and reforming juvenile probationers. 15
They administer, enforce, and represent the law. 159 Although
a probationary search condition allows for warrantless
searches by any law enforcement official, 160 the close rela-
tionship between the probation officer and the probationer
gives the probation officer more information upon which he or
she can base a warrantless search. 16 1 But when a police of-
ficer conducts a warrantless search of a juvenile probationer,
especially when the probationary search condition is un-
known, there is a danger that social policies may conflict:
"the need to enforce conditions to make probation effective for
the community and meaningful for the probationer versus
151. Id. at 886 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. See supra text accompanying note 148.
154. See supra text accompanying note 142.
155. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(d) (West Supp. 1995).
156. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 529-30 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1701 (1995).
157. Id. at 530.
158. See generally text accompanying notes 154-55.
159. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(d) (West Supp. 1995).
160. See supra text accompanying note 10.
161. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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the need to insure that peace officers are not 'rewarded' for
unconstitutional behavior."1 62
F. The Tyrell J. Decision and Rationale
In In re Tyrell J.,163 the California Supreme Court held
that since the juvenile was subject to a valid probationary
search condition, which authorized searches by any law en-
forcement official, he had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the bag of marijuana that he was hiding in his
pants. 16 4 Since there was no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the search was not unconstitutional despite the police
officer's ignorance of the probationary search condition. 165
In reaching its decision, the court examined "societal val-
ues and expectations governing the circumstances of juvenile
probation.' 66 It looked to other conditions of probation pro-
vided by the California Welfare and Institutions Code, 167
which indicate the juvenile probationer's diminished expecta-
tion of privacy over his person and conduct.168 The court then
determined that juvenile probationers subject to valid search
conditions do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
over their persons or property. 169
The court deemed the searching officer's ignorance of the
search condition to be irrelevant when it asserted that "im-
posing a strict requirement that the searching officer must
always have advance knowledge of the search condition
would be inconsistent with the special needs of the juvenile
probation scheme. 1 7 0 Rehabilitation, reasoned the court, is
an "arguably stronger goal [in juvenile probation] than [it is]
in the adult context."1 7' Thus, the special needs of juvenile
162. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 904 (Ct. App. 1991).
163. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
164. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 521.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 528.
167. For instance, the juvenile may be required to attend school without ab-
sence, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 729.2(a) (West Supp. 1995); attend counsel-
ing with his or her parents, id. § 729.2(b); respect a curfew, id. § 729.2(c); sub-
mit to drug testing, id. § 729.9; or participate in a drug rehabilitation program,
id. § 729.10.
168. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 528-29 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1701 (1995).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 530.
171. Id.
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probation demand greater flexibility for the warrant and
probable cause requirements.
172
Although it was not necessary, the majority resolved an-
other important issue concerning the effect of probationary
search conditions which are imposed on juveniles. 173 Accord-
ing to the majority, California law does not require reason-
able cause in order for a police officer to invoke a probation-
ary search condition. 174 Instead, a police officer may search
pursuant to a search condition without any cause whatso-
ever, as long as the decision to search the juvenile is neither
arbitrary nor intended to harass. 175 Thus, the searching of-
ficer need not even have a reasonable suspicion that the juve-
nile has violated a condition of probation or the law.
176
The holding in Tyrell J. leaves the juvenile probationer
with very few Fourth Amendment protections, especially
since the juvenile probationer is considered to lack a reason-
able expectation of privacy.1 77 Furthermore, the holding
opens the door to condoning, and possibly encouraging, police
misconduct. 178
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Based on the holding in In re Tyrell J.,179 any juvenile
with a probationary search condition is now subject to a war-
rantless search by police officers who have absolutely no
knowledge of the search condition. 18 0 The existence of the
search condition can then be used to justify an unconstitu-
tional search, when justification of the search means that in-
criminating evidence can be introduced at trial.1 8 '
The police misconduct in In re Tyrell J. is exactly the
type of activity that the Fourth Amendment and the exclu-
sionary rule are supposed to deter.'8 2 Nonetheless, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court condoned the police misconduct be-
172. See supra text accompanying notes 166-71.
173. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 537 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
174. Id. at 524.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 537-38 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
178. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d. at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
179. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
180. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 532, 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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cause of its strong deterrent effect on juvenile misconduct. 8'
According to the majority's reasoning, the police activity
aided in the rehabilitation and reformation of Tyrell J." 4
However, inherent in juvenile probation is teaching a respect
for the law.18 5 It is therefore difficult to understand how ille-
gal police conduct helps to achieve the goals of juvenile
probation.
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis examines the California Supreme Court's
basis for upholding the unconstitutional search of a juvenile
probationer and for refusing to exclude evidence obtained
from the illegal search.18 6 Additionally, it questions whether
the court's decision achieves the goals of upholding the Con-
stitution and rehabilitating the juvenile probationer. 8 7 The
police officer's conduct would not have been questioned had
he known about Tyrell J.'s search condition. 18 However, the
police officer was ignorant of the search condition, and
although the search of Tyrell J. was improper on its face, it
was held permissible.'8 9  Evidence obtained during the
search was nonetheless admissible at trial.190 The court's de-
cision is unsettling, as it erodes the credibility of Fourth
Amendment protections. 191
A. Reliance on Griffin in In re Tyrell J.
The Tyrell J. majority based its argument for the legality
of probation search conditions on Griffin v. Wisconsin.192
However, there are two significant differences which render
Griffin inapplicable to Tyrell J. 193 First, the search in Tyrell
J. was conducted by a police officer, not by a probation of-
183. Id. at 530.
184. Id.
185. See In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734, 743 (Cal.) (Peters, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
186. See infra parts IV.A, IV.F.
187. See infra parts IV.A, 1V.B, IV.D-G.
188. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 524 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1701 (1995).
189. Id. at 522.
190. Id. at 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 523-24.
193. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 533 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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ficer. 194 Second, the searching officer in Tyrell J. had no
knowledge of the probationer's search condition.
195
1. Who Conducts the Search
Griffin stressed the fact that the search was conducted by
a probation officer, and not by a police officer.1 96 The proba-
tion officer was authorized to conduct a warrantless search of
the defendant probationer's home only if there were "reason-
able grounds" to believe that contraband was present.1 97 The
Court highlighted that the role of a probation officer was dis-
tinctly different from that of a police officer, who has a more
adversarial relationship with the probationer. 9 '
2. Knowledge of the Search Condition
Griffin does not "support the proposition that a police of-
ficer may conduct an unreasonable search of an individual
and have that search subsequently validated if the individual
happens to be a probationer with a search condition, a fact
unknown to the officer at the time of the search." 99 Griffin
only held that it was permissible to dispense with the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement when a probationary
search was conducted by the probation officer.2 ° ° Specifically,
a probation officer must be able to act based on his or her
entire experience with the probationer, assessing probabili-
ties in light of his or her knowledge of the probationer's "life,
character, and circumstances."201
The police officer in Tyrell J. did not have an ongoing su-
pervisory relationship with the juvenile probationer.20 2 The
police officer was only working his beat.20 3 In fact, the officer
did not even know that Tyrell J. was a probationer.20 4 The
194. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
196. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 879 (1987).
197. Id. at 871.
198. Id. at 879.
199. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 909-10 (Ct. App. 1991) (Reardon,
J., dissenting).
200. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77.
201. Id. at 879.
202. See generally In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Cal. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
203. Id. at 521.
204. Id. at 522.
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officer merely knew that Tyrell J.'s gang had been involved in
a shooting incident one week earlier.2"'
The Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in Griffin
strongly suggest that when, as in In re Tyrell J., a search is
conducted by a police officer who is entirely ignorant of the
person's probationary status, the eventual discovery of a pro-
bationary search condition may not be used to justify a
search.20 6 A police officer does not have an ongoing supervi-
sory relationship with the probationer.20 7 Although the po-
lice officer may have society's best interests in mind, it is
likely that the officer does not have the probationer's welfare
in mind.2 8 Thus, the "special needs" of the probation system,
articulated in Griffin, are inapplicable to In re Tyrell J. 219
B. Federal Cases and Legal Commentators Suggest a
Different Holding
No previous United States Supreme Court decision has
directly upheld the constitutionality of the type of search con-
ducted in In re Tyrell J. 210 In fact, relevant federal cases
have placed greater limitations on the prosecution's ability to
use the existence of a probationary search condition as justifi-
cation for a warrantless search.21' Ninth Circuit cases have
held that "even when the searching police officer knows of the
existence of a search condition, reliance on the condition is im-
proper when the officer acted [as] an agent of the police, and
the search was conducted for purposes of law enforcement,
rather than for purposes related to probation or parole."2 12
Similarly, legal commentators support the view that po-
lice officers should not be allowed to undertake an illegal
205. Id. at 521-22.
206. Id. at 533-34 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
207. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878-79 (1987).
208. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 534 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
209. Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting).
210. Id. at 524.
211. Id. at 534 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). See United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d
894, 897 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "the police may not use a parole officer as
a 'stalking horse' to evade the [F]ourth [A]mendments's warrant requirement");
United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959
(1991) (asserting that "under no circumstances should cooperation between law
enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the probation
system 'a subterfuge for criminal investigations'") (citations omitted).
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search for law enforcement purposes, and then seek to justify
it by invoking the existence of a probationer's search condi-
tion.213 A leading treatise on probation and parole explains
that courts "must guard against subterfuge searches. A po-
lice officer lacking probable cause should not be able to ask a
... probation caseworker to conduct a search pursuant to the
latter's general monitoring and supervisory authority."214
In Tyrell J., the police officer's search was conducted pur-
suant to general law enforcement duties: he found a weapon
on Tyrell J.'s friend, and he suspected that Tyrell J. might
also be carrying a weapon.215 According to previous Ninth
Circuit cases, then, reliance on Tyrell J.'s search condition
would have been improper even if the police officer had
known about the probationary search condition.21 6 The
search would have been improper since the police officer con-
ducted it for law enforcement, not probationary purposes.21 7
Thus, the officer's lack of knowledge of the condition compels
an even more restrictive holding than the relevant Ninth Cir-
cuit cases. "In the absence of [any] such knowledge, the ob-
jective of the search is simply unrelated to any proper proba-
"2 181tionary purpose.
Additionally, the legal commentary supports a more re-
strictive finding. The police officer in Tyrell J. lacked prob-
able cause to search the juvenile; he merely had a "reasonable
suspicion" that Tyrell J. might be carrying a weapon.21 9 The
police officer could neither ask the probation officer to conduct
a search, nor purport to invoke the general supervisory and
monitoring authority of the probation officer, because the po-
lice officer was completely ignorant of Tyrell J.'s probationary
status. 22
0
Given the circumstances of Tyrell J., the weight of rele-
vant federal cases and legal commentary mandate a more
213. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 534 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
214. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J.
GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 382 (1983)).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
216. See supra text accompanying note 212.
217. See supra text accompanying note 212.
218. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 909 (Ct. App. 1991) (Reardon, J.,
dissenting).
219. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 538 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
220. Id. at 534 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
887
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
limited finding.221 The prosecution should not be able to use
the probationary search condition as after-the-fact justifica-
tion for the warrantless search.2 22 Furthermore, the federal
cases and legal commentators suggest that in holding as it
did, the California Supreme Court made a major departure
from settled Fourth Amendment doctrine.
C. Tyrell J.'s Probationary Status is Comparable to That
of an Adult Parolee
Probation for the juvenile is different than probation for
the adult.223 Unlike an adult probationer, a "minor who has
been made a ward of the court does not have the option to
decline probation ... 224
The California Supreme Court confronted the issue of a
warrantless search of an adult parolee's residence in People v.
Burgener.22' There, the defendant argued that parole was
mandated for all prisoners who served a determinate prison
term, and that there was no choice as to whether parole
would occur.226 Without a choice, the defendant argued,
"there can be no voluntary consent to inclusion of a warrant-
less search condition among the terms of the parole."227
According to the court, parole helps to reintegrate the
adult into society and to guide the adult toward positive citi-
zenship.228 Parole supervision helps ensure public safety.229
The interest in supervision, in turn, justifies restrictions on
the parolee's liberty and privacy interests.23 0 After balancing
the parolee's interests against society's interest in public
safety, the Burgener court concluded that "warrantless
221. See supra text accompanying notes 211-20.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 211-20.
223. See discussion supra part 1.C.2.
224. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 536 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
225. 714 P.2d 1251 (Cal. 1986).
226. Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1266. The court noted that
[alithough the [Board of Prison Terms] must revoke parole if the pris-
oner refuses to sign the parole agreement.. ., the parolee's acceptance
of parole under the determinate sentence law is in no sense pursuant
to a voluntary agreement by which he has waived his right to privacy
in exchange for release on parole.
Id. n.12.
227. Id. at 1266.
228. Id. at 1267.
229. Id. at 1268.
230. Id.
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searches of parolees are not per se unreasonable if conducted
for a purpose properly related to parole supervision."23 '
The majority emphasized that when an adult parolee has
a search condition, "his privacy interest is [not] so diminished
that random searches or [those] unrelated to a proper parole
supervision purpose are reasonable and constitutionally per-
missible."232 If a warrantless search was not related to a
proper parole supervision purpose, the parole search would
invade the parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy.233
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement need not apply to parole searches initiated for
proper parole supervision purposes.234 Instead, parole
searches are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment if they are based on a reasonable suspicion
standard.235
In Burgener, the adult parolee did not consent to be
searched.236 The search of Burgener, although conducted by
a police officer, was authorized by the defendant's parole
agent.23 v The court thus found that the search was conducted
for a proper parole purpose, and that evidence obtained dur-
ing the search was properly admitted in the lower court.23 8
Search conditions are imposed upon both juvenile proba-
tioners and adult parolees to effectuate rehabilitation and to
deter future misconduct. 239 For Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, then, "there are no significant differences ... between
search conditions imposed upon adult parolees and those im-
posed upon juvenile probationers."24 ° It then follows that
"the Fourth Amendment rights of juveniles can be restricted
to no greater degree than the rights of adult parolees."24 '
231. Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1268.
232. Id. at 1269.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1270.
236. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
237. People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1271 (Cal. 1986).
238. Id.
239. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 536 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
240. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("[L]ike a paroled prisoner, who has no
right to reject release on parole, a juvenile has no choice but to accept the trial
court's decision to place the juvenile on probation.").
241. Id. at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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In Tyrell J., the juvenile probationer likewise did not
truly consent to being searched at any time by a police officer,
whether or not the officer had a warrant.24 2 The search was
not authorized by the probation officer, but was conducted by
a police officer who lacked knowledge of the probationary
search condition.243 By treating Tyrell J.'s status like that of
an adult parolee, it follows that evidence obtained during the
search should have been suppressed.24
D. Gallegos and Martinez are Dispositive of the Issue in
Tyrell J.
Previous California Supreme Court cases similarly sup-
port prohibiting the prosecution's use of a search condition to
attempt to justify an illegal search when the police officer was
ignorant of the search condition.245 For example, in People v.
Gallegos,246 police learned that the adult defendant was on
parole only after they began conducting a warrantless search
of his house.247 Since the arresting officer did not rely on the
defendant's parole status when he initiated the search, the
search and the fruits of that search could not justify the
arrest.
2 48
Similarly, In re Martinez249 prohibited the existence of a
search condition as justification for an illegal search. 250 Po-
lice officers, who did not know of the adult defendant's parole
status, and who undertook a search pursuant to general law
enforcement duties, could not use the parole status to justify
the illegal search.25 '
Both Gallegos and Martinez are dispositive of the issue
in Tyrell J. 25 2 They establish the rule that the prosecution
may not rely on a defendant's search condition when the po-
lice officer conducting the search did not know of its existence
242. Id. at 526-27.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 240-43.
245. See supra part II.B.2.
246. 397 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1964).
247. Gallegos, 397 P.2d at 175-76.
248. Id. at 176.
249. 463 P.2d 734 (Cal.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
250. In re Martinez, 463 P.2d at 737-38.
251. Id.
252. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 535 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
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beforehand.253 Although Gallegos and Martinez concerned
searches of adult parolees, the distinction, as explained
above, is inconsequential.2 54 The Tyrell J. court should have
based its decision on established Fourth Amendment and ex-
clusionary rule principles.
255
E. A Probationary Search Condition Does Not Eviscerate a
Juvenile's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The California Supreme Court upheld the search of
Tyrell J., despite its previous findings in Gallegos and Marti-
nez, because it found that the search condition left the minor
with no reasonable expectation of privacy.256
Probationary search conditions are involuntarily im-
posed on the juvenile probationer.2 57 They are considered to
be one of the conditions necessary for facilitating reformation
and rehabilitation of the juvenile offender. 25 8 The search con-
dition authorizes supervision of the juvenile probationer that
is consistent with the special needs of the juvenile probation
system, and it allows for an impingement on privacy.25 9
There is no express provision in the probationary search
condition that the police officer have knowledge of the condi-
tion before initiating a search.260 However, the absence of
such a provision does not limit the probationer's expectation
of privacy.261 Instead, "[w]hat is controlling is 'what a rea-
sonable person would understand from the language of the
condition itself .... 262 Specifically,
[a] reasonable person would understand the search condi-
tion to mean that he [or she] ... consents to be searched
without a warrant and without reasonable or probable
cause.... [Furthermore,] if such a search is to be con-
253. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 532 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
256. See supra text accompanying note 164.
257. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
258. See supra text accompanying note 100.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
260. See, e.g., In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1701 (1995); see also supra text accompanying note 10.
261. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 910 (Ct. App. 1991) (Reardon, J.,
dissenting).
262. Id. (Reardon, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 340
(Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988)).
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ducted, it will be conducted pursuant to the search condi-
tion that defines the scope of his [or her]... consent.2 63
The juvenile probationer "reasonably retains this mini-
mal expectation of privacy, an expectation that the searching
officer will have knowledge of the consent, and the scope
thereof, as embodied in the search condition .... [S]uch an
expectation... [is] reasonable."264 Tyrell J. retained the rea-
sonable expectation that he would be searched only by a law
enforcement officer who knew of his probationary search con-
dition, and who knowingly invoked its terms.
26 5
F. The Police Officer's Lack of Knowledge was Highly
Relevant
The Tyrell J. majority argued that since the juvenile's
probationary search condition eviscerated his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, the officer's ignorance of the search con-
dition was irrelevant.2 6 It asserted that its conclusion was
consistent with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's ex-
clusionary rule.267 The police officer "took the chance" that
the search of Tyrell J. would be improper.268 If Tyrell J. had
not been subject to a search condition, the marijuana found
during the search would have been inadmissible. 269 Thus,
the majority reasoned, police still have a "sufficient incentive
to try to avoid improperly invading a person's privacy."
27 °
The majority believed that refusing to impose a "knowl-
edge first" requirement for juvenile probation search condi-
tions would not encourage the police to conduct warrantless
searches. 271 Additionally, such a rule "would be inconsistent
with the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme."272
Requiring that the police learn the names and memorize the
faces of juvenile probationers in their jurisdictions would se-
263. Id. at 910-11 (Reardon, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 911 (Reardon, J., dissenting).
265. See In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 536 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
266. Id. at 529-30.
267. Id. at 531.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 532.
270. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 532.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 530.
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verely erode the deterrent effect of probationary search
conditions.273
There are two problems with the majority's reasoning.274
First, the deterrent effect of probationary search conditions
will not be severely eroded if a knowledge requirement is im-
posed.275 To the extent that a juvenile probationer subject to
a "search condition is deterred from engaging in criminal ac-
tivity because of the fear of being searched by any police of-
ficer at any time, such fear and deterrence will exist regard-
less of whether police officers must 'learn the names and
memorize the faces' of juvenile probationers."2 76 However, to
argue that the deterrent effect of probation would be greater
served if more police officers were allowed to conduct this
type of search is to overlook the fact that this is police
misconduct.2 77
Second, refusing to impose a "knowledge-first" require-
ment does not safeguard the juvenile probationer's constitu-
tional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.2 78 Allowing illegal searches by police officers who
are ignorant of the search condition only promotes unreason-
able searches.2 7 9 If a police officer is faced "with a situation
where there might be something to gain, even where the pos-
sibility of gain is remote ... the danger of the [officer] engag-
ing in unconstitutional methods of law enforcement is
acute."28 o
Tyrell J. was hiding an illegal drug in his pants. 2 1 How-
ever, the exclusionary rule is designed for the exact purpose
of excluding incriminating evidence that is obtained as a re-
sult of an illegal search by a police officer. 2 2 The reformative
and "rehabilitative foundations of the entire [juvenile proba-
tion] system can be completely undermined when a [proba-
tioner] observes his [or her] teacher, the government, violate
273. Id.
274. See id. at 537 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
275. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 537 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
280. In re Martinez, 463 P.2d 734, 742 (Cal.) (Peters, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
281. See supra text accompanying note 13.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
893
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the law with apparent impunity."283 Thus, juvenile offenders
cannot be expected to learn a respect for the law when police
are allowed to search people in violation of the
Constitution.284
The holding in Tyrell J. provides police officers with an
incentive to search any juvenile, despite the officer's lack of
probable cause and a search warrant.28 5 Contrary to the ma-
jority's beliefs, the decision does encourage police to search
first, and ask questions later.286 This type of policy renders
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule obsolete in juve-
nile court proceedings.28 7
G. Police Officers Must Have at Least a Reasonable
Suspicion to Conduct a Search
The police officer in Tyrell J. discovered that the juve-
nile's friend was carrying a concealed weapon. 28 8 This discov-
ery gave the officer at least a reasonable suspicion that Tyrell
J. had also violated the law.28 9 However, the majority did not
find that a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity justified the
warrantless search, or even that it was required before the
officer could initiate the search.290 Rather, the majority held
that a police officer may conduct a search for any reason
whatsoever, even if the officer lacks a reasonable suspicion, as
long as the search is not intended to harass the person being
searched.291
The court's holding is inconsistent with its previous deci-
sion in People v. Burgener.292 Burgener stands for the propo-
sition that for a warrantless search of an adult parolee who is
subject to a search condition to be valid, there must be a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on objective, articulable facts, that
the person is engaged in conduct that violates the terms of
parole.293 Since there are no significant differences between
283. In re Martinez, 463 P.2d at 743 (Peters, J., dissenting).
284. See id. (Peters, J., dissenting).
285. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 538 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
286. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 532, 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
288. See supra text accompanying note 6.
289. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
290. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
292. 714 P.2d 1251 (Cal. 1986).
293. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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search conditions imposed on adult parolees and those im-
posed on juvenile probationers,294 the Burgener holding is ap-
plicable to juvenile probationers.295 Thus a police officer
must have at least a reasonable suspicion that the juvenile
probationer is engaged in conduct which violates the terms of
probation.296  A blanket rule that proscribes warrantless
searches only when they are intended to harass, offers insuffi-
cient protection for the juvenile probationer.29 v
To reach a conclusion contrary to, and broader than the
reasonable suspicion holding in Burgener, the Tyrell J. ma-
jority relied on People v. Bravo.298 That reliance, however, is
misplaced.299 Bravo held that an adult probationer could be
searched with neither reasonable cause nor reasonable suspi-
cion."' The only reason that an adult probationer can be
searched without reasonable cause or suspicion is because he
or she consents in advance to a warrantless search.3 0 1 Thus,
the court noted that adult probationers "have, as a condition
precedent to receiving the court's leniency, agreed in advance
to waive their Fourth Amendment rights. To condition war-
rantless probation searches upon reasonable cause would
make the probation order superfluous and vitiate its
purpose."3 °2
Tyrell J. was a juvenile probationer.30 3 He did not give
advance consent to a warrantless search; allowing a choice in
the matter is inconsistent with the juvenile probation
scheme.30 a Rather, the probationary search condition was in-
voluntarily imposed on him, as part of the juvenile court's "fi-
294. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
295. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
296. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 532, 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 538 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
299. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
300. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 341 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
904 (1988).
301. Id. However, "if a sentencing judge believes that a 'reasonable-cause'
requirement is warranted in the particular case... he has the discretion to
place such language in the probation search condition. Absent such express
language... a reasonable-cause requirement will not be implied." Id. at 340
n.6.
302. Id. at 342 (quoting People v. Bravo, 211 Cal. Rptr. 439, 445 (Ct. App.
1985) (Sonenshine, J., dissenting)).
303. See supra text accompanying note 9.
304. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
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nal order."305 Thus, Tyrell J.'s Fourth Amendment rights
should not be restricted any greater than those of adult parol-
ees.3 0 6 Just as warrantless searches of adult parolees must
be based on reasonable suspicion, so must searches of juve-
nile probationers who are subject to search conditions.3 7 Re-
quiring this minimal amount of articulable suspicion offers
more protection for the juvenile probationer than the major-
ity's "no harassment" finding.0
V. PROPOSAL
The holding in Tyrell J. leaves the police with almost no
limits when it comes to searching juvenile probationers,3 °9
and it leaves juvenile probationers with no Fourth Amend-
ment protections against the police or the courts.3 10 The po-
lice officer does not need to have knowledge of the juvenile's
probationary search condition, since the mere fact of proba-
tionary status eviscerates the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. 31' A search is only prohibited when the officer's sole
purpose is to harass.312
This comment proposes that courts should put greater
restrictions on the prosecution's ability to introduce evidence
obtained during the course of a warrantless search of a juve-
nile probationer. The prosecution should not be allowed to
introduce evidence "through the back door." Specifically, pro-
bationary search conditions should only authorize warrant-
less searches by police officers who knowingly invoke the ju-
venile's probationary search condition. The police officer
must know about the search condition and articulate a reli-
ance on that condition before the officer can search and intro-
duce incriminating evidence later on at trial.
Imposing a "knowledge first" requirement will not se-
verely erode the deterrent effect of probationary search condi-
tions. Instead, this prerequisite to conducting a warrantless
search ensures that the provisions of the Fourth Amendment
305. See supra text accompanying note 99.
306. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 538 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
307. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
308. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
309. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 529.
311. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 529.
312. Id. at 530.
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are not violated. When the police officer has knowledge of the
valid search condition, the warrantless search is not unrea-
sonable; it is constitutional under Griffin v. Wisconsin,3 13 and
the juvenile understands that the terms of his or her proba-
tion allow this type of police conduct. The knowledge first re-
quirement only diminishes the juvenile's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy to the extent that it allows a search by a police
officer who knows and who relies upon the juvenile's proba-
tionary search condition.
A knowledge first rule is not inconsistent with the special
needs of the juvenile probation scheme. Rather, the knowl-
edge requirement reinforces the goals of probation. The juve-
nile probationer is more apt to learn a respect for the law
when a police officer is similarly required to follow the law,
and when incriminating evidence must be excluded if certain
procedural requirements are not met.
Adhering to Fourth Amendment and established exclu-
sionary rule doctrine would mean, as it often does, that evi-
dence that could convict a defendant would be excluded.
However, that is the consequence of the exclusionary rule as
it exists today. Adhering to the exclusionary rule in the con-
text of juvenile probation would serve to reinforce public con-
fidence in the police and in the courts, that they will follow
the rules. Although juveniles are not afforded the same privi-
leges and opportunities as adults, basic constitutional protec-
tions, specifically freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, belong to citizens of all ages.
Imposing a knowledge first requirement could come in
the form of a provision in the California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code. It would acknowledge that search conditions may
be imposed on juvenile probationers, but it would limit the
prosecution's ability to rely on the conditions. Specifically, it
would require that the court not admit evidence that was ob-
tained as the result of a warrantless search of a juvenile with
a search condition, unless the searching officer knew in ad-
vance of the search that the juvenile was on probation and
had a search condition. The provision could read as follows:
Probationary Search Conditions
The juvenile court may impose probationary search
conditions upon wards of the court in order to assist in
313. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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the reformation and rehabilitation of wards of the
court.
Knowledge First Requirement
A juvenile court must not admit evidence that is ob-
tained during a warrantless search of a juvenile pro-
bationer, unless the searching officer proves that he/
she personally possessed knowledge of the search con-
dition in advance of the search which produced the in-
criminating evidence.
Ensuring adherence to the knowledge first requirement
would, of course, be left to individual law enforcement juris-
dictions or counties. It could include more police officers on a
particular "beat," or it could include more intensive training
and case study. However, enforcing the knowledge first re-
quirement is something that all California courts should -
and must - do immediately, regularly, and consistently.
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's recent holding in In re
Tyrell J.314 was a departure from established Fourth Amend-
ment and exclusionary rule doctrine. The court held as it did
because it believed that excluding the evidence, and thus not
holding the juvenile probationer responsible for his offense,
was consistent with the juvenile probation scheme and was in
the juvenile's best interest. This comment has argued, how-
ever, that admitting the evidence was inconsistent with
Fourth Amendment and exclusionary rule principles, as well
as the needs of the juvenile probationer. Juvenile probation-
ers must learn a respect for the law, and to do this, they must
know that the law will respect them.
Kristin Anne Joyce
314. 876 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1701 (1995).
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